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The Paradoxes of Resurgent Coal and Low-Carbon Transition 
Energy is surging up policy agendas worldwide, responding to multiple, overlapping crises of 
energy supply and demand, political turmoil at sources of key energy resources and climate 
change generated by fossil fuel emissions.  Policy discourse of ‘transition’ to ‘low-carbon’ 
(usually renewable) energy technologies is now ubiquitous.  Yet one shocking trend 
challenges this picture: coal, the most polluting, high-carbon (i.e. simply ‘carbon’!) fuel, is 
not merely stubbornly maintaining absolute or relative levels, but undergoing a ‘phenomenal’ 
(Smil, 2010:144), ‘historically incredible’ resurgence (Economist, 2012).   
 
Nor is this trend decelerating.  ‘[B]y 2006’ it was ‘the world’s fastest growing fuel’ 
(Montgomery, 2010:95).   The Fukushima nuclear disaster has prompted several high energy-
consuming countries, including Japan and Germany, to expand coal-powered electricity 
(Washington Post, 2011; Smil, 2010:94), while prices for American coal exports are falling 
with the shale gas boom (Economist, 2013).  The biggest source of coal’s growth, however, 
lies in developing countries, especially China and India.  The cheapest, most abundant and 
highly calorific of fuels, coal’s attractions for energizing development are clear.  Coal is 
forecast to surge back into the global no.1 spot, overtaking oil in 2020s-2030s; and at 
absolute levels dwarfing its commanding heights a century ago.   
 
Coal, however, never went away.  It has been a major material underbelly to the 
‘dematerialized’ hi-tech knowledge economy; and will inevitably persist as attempts at low-
carbon transition unfold, given its structural importance to current patterns of economic 
growth and the apparently inherent (if unfortunate) slowness of energy transitions (Smil, 
2010; Montgomery, 2010), which current trends show no sign of falsifying.  Fossil fuels will 
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still contribute 64% - i.e. the overwhelming majority – of energy growth for the crucial 
(regarding emissions mitigation) period of 2010-30 (vs. 83% 1990-2010).   
 
Given slow energy transitions, which must themselves be energised, therefore, coal confronts 
us with a paradox: the central role of fossil fuels in powering transition to low-carbon 
societies.  A paradox, moreover, all the more excruciating when a trilemma is acknowledged: 
the largest source of medium-term emissions growth will be large developing economies; 
low-carbon innovation and deployment will not happen there without further development, 
which means increased coal consumption; and there is no historical precedent of economic 
development without commensurately increased emissions (Edenhofer, 2010; Ockwell, 
2008).  Yet low-carbon transition remains urgent. The result is emergence of a powerful new 
discourse of ‘clean coal’, focused on carbon capture and storage (or sequestration) (CCS).   
 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) calculates that CCS could contribute over 15% of 
global GHG emission reductions needed for the mid-century target of 450 ppm of CO2 
(Tollefson, 2011).  This would need 3200 CCS projects sequestering 150 GtCO2.  In fact, 
CCS is dragging along, with virtually no progress since 2007 and not a single full-size coal-
fired power plant with CCS in operation.  Yet – another paradox – ‘clean coal’ remains very 
much alive as a policy dream, with a powerful and growing group of supporters bolstered by 
an aggressive global PR campaign (e.g. www.coalcandothat.com).   
 
These multiple paradoxes of ‘clean coal’ need elaboration and explanation.  In doing so, 
however, we address three key points.  First (section 2), we introduce the theoretical 
argument that ‘energy’ – conceived as social, cultural and political socio-technical systems – 
must be explored as a key explanatory factor in accounts of social change and, in particular, 
of the power that executes and is itself formed by such change.  Only from this perspective 
can we examine the nature and implications of coal’s contemporary resurgence.   
 
This leads to the second argument, that there are crucial inter-relations between the dominant 
power regime and energy systems of particular socio-historical formations.  This opens up 
new possibilities for social critique of energy systems; past, present and emerging.  This 
argument is illustrated (sections 3 and 4) regarding multiple complex connections between 
the power regime of nineteenth century liberalism and a coal-dominated energy system that 
underpinned the birth of industrial capitalism.    
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 Finally, a more speculative application of the first two points is developed, as substantive 
illustration of this perspective’s contribution to understanding, and critique, of contemporary 
developments in energy systems.  Here, ‘clean coal’ is shown to provide a window into 
political and socioeconomic trends that will underpin low-carbon transition efforts in coming 
decades; and, thus, into the form of ‘low-carbon’ societies likely to emerge from them.   
 
1) Energizing Society, Powering Society 
Confronting the urgency of low-carbon transition while ‘taking society seriously’ (Urry, 
2011) raises the question: ‘how is society energized?’ Social forms, as living systems, depend 
upon flows of energy maintaining their systemic viability far from thermodynamic 
equilibrium (Smil, 2010).  ‘Energy’, therefore, is never just another resource or commodity, 
another ‘sector’ of the economy, but central to a social system’s very metabolic survival.  
Moreover, since only the simplest forms of energy may be harnessed without infrastructures 
(Smil, 2010:12), energy resources are always mediated through socio-technical systems that 
give them a particular social meaning and systemic role. Finally, a thermodynamic 
perspective must acknowledge a system’s entropic, not merely energic, costs (Biel, 2012).   
 
From a social perspective, attention to entropic flows raises crucial questions of where and 
how the massive entropic costs of industrial capitalist and consumerist society (Smart, [this 
issue]) are dispersed and (possibly) accepted; a question of particular importance since global 
capitalism appears to be testing the entropic limits of the biosphere (Biel, 2012).  Yet these 
processes of inclusion and exclusion, ordering and dumping of disorder, immediately alert us 
to often-neglected connections between flows of energy and power.  From this perspective, 
the key questions become: How is energy produced and used, and how does it construct and 
drive social systems?  How does it power society? And how does it ‘power power’: the 
political coalitions, dominant and resistant; ways of life and social practices from which these 
emerge; and forms of political regime they themselves in turn condition?  This demands 
analysis of complex systemic positive (and negative) feedback loops: between production and 
consumption of negentropy; development of negentropy sources and sinks, hence entire 
socio-technical systems and their ‘energy sector’; ‘common-sense’ trajectories of 




Crucially, power is here conceived not as brute coercion that must be tamed and legitimized 
by social consensus.  Instead, power is productive not merely oppressive, ubiquitous and 
dispersed not possessed, and hence normatively ambiguous not a matter of censure.  The 
focus is thus on the ‘how’ of power, as in Gramsci (1971) and/or the later works of Foucault  
(e.g. Foucault, 2004, 2009, 2010; see Jessop & Sum, 2006).  Moreover, these power relations 
are dynamically constructed and performed in concrete material-discursive practices and 
‘power technologies’.  Going beyond Foucault, however, power may thus take the form of 
socio-historical regimes, the systems emergent from constellations of heterogeneous power 
techniques that in turn condition (the emergence of) practices, institutions and subjectivities 
(Tyfield, 2012a).  This allows analysis of how, within a regime, the ‘going on’ of practices is 
willingly, actively and, possibly, hegemonically achieved, even by those at whose cost the 
system runs. 
 
This theoretical perspective offers important lessons in the abstract regarding the politics and 
sociology of climate change (Giddens, 2010; Urry, 2011).  It forces acknowledgement of the 
irreducible role of power in the dynamics of transition, in terms of construction and 
emergence of new social forms; forms, moreover, that will themselves be characterised by 
new power relations/constellations.  Moreover, this perspective affords important substantive 
insights regarding the form and distribution of this new power, the specific political regimes 
of low-carbon society, as we explore in section 6. 
 
2) Liberalism as Dominant Power Regime  
The key inter-relations between energy and power regimes are specific and concrete, not 
merely abstract.  Coal provides an excellent historical illustration of this regarding the most 
important (i.e. dominant) political regime of a growing global capitalism over recent 
centuries, namely liberalism.  By ‘liberalism’ we here connote a power regime not a political 
philosophy nor (liberal, representative) democracy.  Rather, liberalism consists of ‘living 
dangerously’ (Foucault, 2009:384) and minimal government, i.e. government by and through 
(construction of) freedom(s), and hence an elite politics capable of achieving popular 
acceptance and active participation, even of the disenfranchised and burdened (Gramsci, 
1971).  The key question regarding liberalism and power, therefore, is ‘how is this possible’?   
 
A crucial insight here, opening up possibilities of social critique, is to stress liberalism’s two 
faces, their mutual dependence and co-production, as well as their tensions.  On the one hand, 
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productively, liberalism must be interrogated in terms of the regimes of productive growth, as 
new (socio-technical) techniques and practices emerge that (unpredictably, a posteriori) 
reinforce each other in positive feedback loops; i.e. precisely the process of transition and 
emergence.  Liberalism works, therefore, through (construction of) new knowledgeable 
freedoms, but always and only for (the benefit of) some (Losurdo, 2011).  Key elements of 
this process are thus the new enabling truths, knowledges and associated institutions/groups, 
both of techno-scientific expertise and of legitimation.   
 
Yet, negatively, liberalism is also and always establishing the ‘security’ conditions of 
intelligibility of the former.  This thus establishes the ‘paradoxes of liberalism’, an essential 
split in liberal society (Foucault, 2010:61-70) that elicits an intrinsic fear and aggression but 
is itself produced by liberal power technologies.  Governing through (new) freedoms, liberal 
power regimes are fundamentally dependent upon legitimation through both institutions and 
concrete decisions that accord with what is, in parallel, socially defined as ‘rational’.  In 
particular, the key question for liberalism is the known, knowable ‘real’ limits of state power; 
a question that manifests in the acute importance of knowledge of real and/or ‘naturally’ self-
regulating processes that supposedly generate spontaneous social order, particularly the 
market.  Insofar as such ‘knowledge’ may be performatively self-legitimating, ‘to govern 
well’ really is ‘to govern less’ (Gordon, 2000: xxviii).  The necessary flipside of such 
concern for natural limits, however, is the limits of nature, definition of that which is 
‘unnatural’, which compromises ‘natural self-regulation’ and so is an existential threat; and 
so should be delegitimized, feared and destroyed. In governing by producing freedoms, 
therefore, liberalism also necessarily involves (‘rational’) delineation of and active 
construction of system-existential security threats.  Liberalism is thus marked by an inherent 
social binarism, a ‘racial’ struggle to ‘defend society’ against its mortal, eternal and unnatural 
foes (Foucault, 2004).  And as such it is characterised by a schizophrenia, haunted by an 
irreconcilable shadow side that it itself produces.  
 
Just as the productive aspect of liberal power regimes may be explored regarding positive 
feedback loops of socio-technical change and sedimentation of power coalitions, so too can 
such analysis be pursued for the negative face.  Yet here focus is on new truths/knowledges 
of delegitimation; new delegitimated (possibly ‘racial’) subjectivities; and new practices, 
groups and institutional forms associated with these.  As an emergent system, however, these 
two faces are not to be investigated separately but precisely in their co-construction. 
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 To these two faces, however, we must add a third issue, namely the crucial contradistinction 
– being an historical, interpretive process – of the emerging dominant regime to that which 
preceded it.  This socio-historically situated contrast provides critical conditions of 
intelligibility for the success of the former; what may be called the ‘disciplinary lessons of 
history’.  Most importantly, this takes the form of the newly knowledgeable definition (and 
hence ‘responsible’, ‘rational’ acknowledgement) of the ‘security’ threats ‘of the age’, which 
thereby accords various virtues to the new liberal regime as ‘true’ as well as ‘progressive’, 
‘contemporary’ etc…   
 
But what is the connection here to coal?  First, historically we explore some mutual 
connections between energy and power regime – coal and classical nineteenth century British 
liberalism respectively – focusing especially on their parallel rise to dominance; i.e. the 
‘transition’ to a coal-fired liberal regime.  Then, secondly, we deploy the framework in a 
more speculative social critique of contemporary energy-power relations regarding coal’s 
resurgence and an emerging low-carbon society based on ‘clean coal’ and CCS innovation. 
 
3) King Coal and Classical Liberalism 
Tracing the ‘how’ of power regarding coal (production, distribution, consumption) in the 
early/mid-nineteenth century, the age of emerging dominance of industrial society, 
illuminates parallel processes of transition to dominance of the power regime of the time, 
namely the hegemonic ‘classical liberalism’ of British laissez faire and early industrialism.  A 
full account of these connections would be a substantial undertaking in its own right, 
resonating with broader attempts at re-reading history from an Anthropocene perspective that 
takes the non-human agency of geology and energy flows into account (e.g. Dalby, 2007; 
Clarke & Yusoff, [this issue]).  This analysis thus focuses on the two sides of liberalism: a 
productive regime; and its shadow of ‘security’ and exclusion. 
 
First, regarding the socio-technical system, coal was central to the emergence of industrial 
society, generating self-reinforcing dynamics of political and economic profit along with new 
freedoms.  The social meaning of coal arose from its material inseparability from iron and 
steam (Freese, 2003:66) in positive feedback loops of increasing demand and supply and 
falling costs, via: steam-powered water pumps for coalmines; coke (substituting wood-
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sourced charcoal with partially-combusted coal) and mechanical blast furnaces; railways and 
steamships; and, later, mechanized factories and engineering tool-shops.  
 
These positive dynamics of coal extended far beyond the ‘coal’ economy.  In its abundance in 
the newly empowered nation-states and its uniquely intense energetic content, coal was the 
entropic presupposition of a ‘new “energetic metabolism”, based on cities and large-scale 
manufacturing’ (Mitchell, 2009:402; Nye, 1998:99); new both in its spatial arrangement of 
discrete, concentrated sites of production and (industrial) consumption and in the huge 
increase in systemic entropic demands.  Substituting wood by coal facilitated massive release 
for agriculture of land preserved for trees, which conditioned an agricultural revolution and 
massive increase in food production (Mitchell, 2009; Pomeranz, 2000).  Together with 
colonialism and global trade, themselves built upon new coal-steam-iron technologies of 
mobility and conquest, these afforded production and transport of sufficient food to meet 
demand in these growing industrial urban centres. 
 
The system transition, however, was also a power transition, constructing the archetypal 
power technologies of classical liberalism.  In business, new limited liability companies 
responded to the ‘economic advantage in large-scale operation’ and increasingly evident 
potential for ‘a large market’ epitomized by coal-based industries (Nye, 1998:108).  Indeed, 
the ‘huge capital requirements of such [coal-based] enterprises made the corporate form of 
organization virtually mandatory’ (p.104).  Moreover, the ‘ability to unleash the power of 
coal through steam launched an intoxicating [and self-propagating] era of optimism and 
excitement’ (Freese, 2003:73).  No growing body of ‘truth’ better captured this sense or was 
materially corroborated more than classical liberalism’s central dogma, namely Adam 
Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ of the naturally self-regulating market (e.g. Polanyi, 1945/1991).  
Coal-based socio-technical change thus demonstrated the natural limits of government, the 
heart of liberalism. 
  
Yet, coal also constructed, depended upon, excluded and delegitimated another shadow 
world; its ‘security’ flipside that evoked an ‘unacknowledged schizophrenia in national self’ 
(Johnson, 2010:267).  As a leading contemporaneous liberal commentator, de Tocqueville, 
noted on visiting Manchester, ‘here humanity attains its most complete development and its 
most brutish’ (quoted in Freese, 2003:72).  Coal was ‘a type of traumatic knowledge’ 
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(Johnson, 2010:271), but ‘traumatic’ precisely because of the inseparable connection between 
both civilisation and depravity, culture and debasement, freedom and exploitation.    
 
Moreover, the practices of coal’s production and consumption also instantiated precisely the 
‘racial’ binarism(s) intrinsic to liberalism’s elite power technologies.  In the household, class 
and gender distinctions were pronounced by coal-based heating; tending and stoking fires 
was hard, dirty, time-consuming women’s work, while a gentleman would benefit from year-
round comfort, Emerson’s ‘portable climate’ making ‘Canada as warm as Calcutta’ (Freese, 
2003:10).  Similarly, soot and smoke dirtied and degraded clothes, providing graphic 
sumptuary differences between classes able to afford large wardrobes and/or regularly wash 
clothes (Freese, 2003). In providing starkly different levels of comfort, environmental hazard 
(e.g. diseases from coal pollution and deprivation of sunlight, including childhood rickets) 
and access to the alimentary benefits of improving diets, class was even evident in physical 
size and gait, turning different classes into seemingly distinct biological races. 
 
Yet narratives of racial distinctiveness and struggle were also powered by coal in other 
crucial ways, these legitimating the ‘natural order’ of exploitation on which the liberal-
industrial regime depended.  Most obvious is the powering of colonialism and, crucially, 
slavery (Losurdo, 2011), including in cotton production for the booming textile mills central 
to early coal-based industrialization.  Similarly, at the heart of the coal free-market economy, 
Freese (2003:45) notes how ‘miners and their families, commonly referred to as a separate 
race of humans, were increasingly ostracized by society.’   
 
These racial categorizations then legitimated the assumption, and wilful acceptance, by some 
of the population of the new risks of the age.  Consider the extraordinary dangers of mining: 
explosions; sudden asphyxiation; roof collapse; drowning, especially as mines were dug ever-
deeper; falling down shafts or collisions with coal-trucks; as well as the ‘normality’ of 
backbreaking, cramped work.  British miners surveyed in 1851 and 1861, for instance, had 
mortality rates of nearly 20% by age 20 (as opposed to 2% for ‘persons of rank or property’), 
and nearly three quarters by age 45 (vs. 24%) (Coyle, 2010:207).  
 
To be sure, the assumption of these risks was not without resistance and, indeed, classical 
liberalism’s emergence was a process constituted by resistance as much as by domination.  
Consider, for instance, the subsequent emergence towards the century’s end of a powerful 
8 
 
socialist movement; a development in which the systemic importance of coalminers, in a 
position of largely unsupervisable control of the key energetic resource, and, thence, their 
increasing success at unionization, was absolutely crucial (Mitchell 2009, 2011).   Yet the 
very fact that such unified, powerful resistance took nearly a century after classical liberal 
industrialism’s initial take-off to emerge, despite a century of exceptional revolutionary 
fervour (Hobsbawm, 1962), also shows the importance of coal in construction and 
maintenance of this ‘shadow world’; which was, in turn, inseparable from the initial 
productivity and emergence of the liberal-coal system. 
 
4) Neoliberalism and After  
We return now to explore contemporary energy ‘transitions’.  Yet, in doing so, we must first 
attend to the contemporary power-energy regime that current developments aim to transcend, 
namely (oil-based) neoliberalism.  The key dimensions of the globally-dominant neoliberal 
regime have been elaborated elsewhere (e.g. Crouch, 2011; Harvey, 2005; Mirowski & 
Plehwe, 2009) and recent scholarship has also begun to detail the intricate connections with 
an oil-dominated energy system (Mitchell, 2011; Urry, 2013).  For our purposes, however, of 
most importance are the ‘disciplinary lessons of history’ that neoliberalism’s current crisis 
presents as context for ongoing efforts at ‘low-carbon transition’.    
 
Neoliberalism is undeniably a form of liberal power regime in the central importance it 
accords the market in limiting ‘rational’ state government.  Yet, is is also a striking departure 
from classical liberalism.  The characteristic truth and knowledges of neoliberalism concern 
the epistemic regime of the ‘market of ideas’ (Mirowski, 2011).  This conceives of the market 
and its virtues primarily as an epistemic, and not allocative, phenomenon. The market 
optimizes, as automatic outcome of spontaneous interaction of (negatively-)free individuals, 
the social aggregate of all human knowledge, in the form of materialized knowledges that 
succeed on the market. The trans-personal, automatic epistemic mechanism of the market, it 
is argued, thus necessarily instantiates better-informed decisions than could possibly be made 
by any rational planner.   
 
The implications of this market foundationalism (if not ‘fundamentalism’ qua zealotry) are 
profound.  For, absent any rational gainsaying of the market, there are simply no knowable, 
real limits to the market nor to that which may be optimized by subjecting it to market 
discipline; a market will always reach a better decision regarding government of a 
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phenomenon than ‘rational’ policymaking.  Apparent limits or the emergence of new threats 
and risks are thus merely new opportunities for Promethean entrepreneurship.  Conversely, 
classical liberalism is essentially concerned to demarcate and then police the ‘natural’ limits 
and necessary preconditions of liberal, free-market government.  A particular instance of 
‘market failure’ for neoliberalism thus does not represent the legitimate task of a limited state 
power but rather a task for the state to construct conditions, using unlimited power if 
necessary, such that the market does ‘work’.  This radical strain of liberalism is thus also its 
negation in its crucial (and self-contradictory) dependence upon unfettered expansion of state 
power in the project of marketizing all aspects of society. 
 
This is evident in a specific model of innovation involving state-sponsored accumulation by 
dispossession of public and common knowledges through strong global intellectual property 
rights (Tyfield, 2008).  This model also focuses on innovations that: yield the promise of 
high, short-term returns, especially as financial(izable) assets; yield products that service the 
market demands of corporate/individual consumers, rather than publics or states; and are 
compatible with corporate enclosure of bodies of knowledge that promise to maximize global 
corporate control of crucial sectors, such as food (e.g. genetically-modified crops) or health 
(e.g. biotechnology/pharmaceuticals). 
 
Conversely, innovation in energy – involving large, public infrastructures, dependent upon 
broad knowledge-sharing and taking many years to develop – would typically meet few, if 
any, of these characteristics. Indeed, there has been an almost complete lack of progress in 
energy innovation since the 1970s (Smil, 2010:121), when investment was booming in 
response to the OPEC oil shocks and seeming ‘limits to growth’ (Meadows et al., 1972).  
This is primarily due to a collapse in energy R&D investment from the 1980s, with 
neoliberalism’s advent to global dominance, for at least two further reasons.  First, 
neoliberalism is systematically disinterested in any ecological-entropic or energy resource 
limits to market-based economic growth, except insofar as these are opportunities for further 
entrepreneurial profit.  Secondly, following the monetarist ‘counter-revolution’ (Arrighi, 
1994) and the global reassertion of (now neoliberal) American dominance, the processes of 
financialized creative destruction, the defeat of OPEC and then the USSR’s demise all 
conditioned return of the ‘good times’ of cheap, seemingly unlimited and dependably secure 




Yet this process has now come to a crashing halt, in the multiple, overlapping crises that a 
generation of neoliberalism has conditioned.  What next, then, for a revitalized post-crisis 
capitalism and its associated political regime of a re-emergent liberalism? 
 
5) ‘Clean Coal’, China and Liberalism 2.0 
Coal will be a, or even the, key energy resource as low-carbon transition slowly unfolds. 
‘Clean coal’ thus provides a particularly insightful window on the interdependent near-future 
emergence of energy and power regimes.  From this perspective, the key questions are: how 
can coal be redefined socially such that it is ‘indispensible’ for low-carbon transition? What 
must be constructed for this new ‘common-sense’ to be intelligible?  We set out four key 
dimensions of contemporary challenges of coal, all of which are in emergent evidence, by 
way of ‘notes on an emerging political regime’. This affords a preliminary, speculative 
formulation of a ‘liberalism 2.0’ in terms of liberalism’s three dimensions, including its 
fundamental repudiation of the neoliberalism preceding it.   
 
1) China: The first issue for the future of ‘clean coal’ is the global rise of China, the epochal 
development of recent decades (e.g. Jacques, 2010).  (The rise of) China is inseparable from 
(the resurgence of) coal and vice versa.  China today represents 47% of global coal 
consumption, likely to rise to 53% by 2030, while constituting 80% of growth of world coal 
demand 1990-2010 and an expected 77% 2010-30 (BP outlook, 2011). China mines 3 billion 
tonnes a year (three times the amount in the US, global no.2) and is the no.1 importer (ahead 
of Japan since 2011).  Between 2000-2008, China more than doubled its coal extraction to 
40% of global output – more than that from the 2nd-7th largest combined (Smil, 2010:97).  
Similarly, domestically, ‘no other country is as dependent on coal as China’ (Smil, 2010:97), 
coal representing 70% of electricity generation (95% of all fossil fuels used to produce 
electricity) and 64% of total primary energy supply (2008).   
 
China is also thus the single most important issue regarding the future of coal and its global 
environmental impact.  By 2020, given its coal consumption, China’s GHG emissions are set 
to overtake the entire OECD excluding the US (Montgomery, 2010:47) and to be double 
those of the EU (Climate Group, 2009).  In short, cleaning Chinese coal is arguably the sine 
qua non regarding prospects of global mitigation of GHG emissions to mid-century (e.g. 
Friedman, 2009; Watts, 2010).  This is all the more so when it is acknowledged that the 
prospects for the end of the global North’s current depression hinges on economic growth in 
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China and other large industrializing countries (e.g. FT, 2013).  And this, in turn, suggests 
that a geopolitical shift in power regime towards a more Sinocentric world is also 
increasingly in the global North’s self-interest, so that again, energy and power regimes are 
transitioning in parallel.  
 
China is also central to the future of coal as the most dramatic example of the tensions of 
environment and development.  Coal is central to the continued economic development of 
many large developing countries for reasons detailed above.  To be anti-coal, therefore, can 
easily be portrayed as to be pro-poverty or even racist, the obsession of the Western 
environmentalist happy to kick away the ladder to levels of economic prosperity that they 
themselves enjoy.  Moreover, the energy-development-emissions trilemma effectively makes 
development, and (risk of) concomitant growth in emissions, a prerequisite for global low-
carbon transition and dramatic reduction in such emissions.  The prospects of, and barriers to, 
China developing a ‘clean coal’ sector, however, illustrate several other socio-political 
dimensions of the contemporary coal challenge that elaborate the specific socio-cultural 
meaning of ‘clean coal’ and the power regime likely to be developed in parallel.   
 
2) A resurgent state and newly defined security threats: The first of these socio-political 
dimensions is the likely resurgence of industrial policy and importance of the state in 
business, industry and innovation.  This, in turn, is inseparable from forcible reappearance 
amongst political elites of acceptance of new security threats that the state alone seems able 
to address.  China, its rise and perceptions thereof, will undoubtedly be central to these 
dynamics. 
  
First, as the pervasive global ontological insecurity from the multiple overlapping crises of 
the neoliberal era deepens, with increasing protest and unrest, a new dominant dynamic is 
likely to emerge demanding serious account of, and urgent action regarding, all the crises.  
Furthermore, there is the possible wild card of a global military situation, given positive 
feedbacks amongst the various crises and an increased systemic sensitivity to political 
‘shocks’.  There is, after all, no shortage of plausible candidates as the spark of a much bigger 
global conflagration.  This would have major implications regarding not just popular political 
acceptance of the importance of energy security, but also regarding the fortunes of coal.  Oil 
is concentrated in ‘difficult’ places that are the most likely theatres of any such war, while 
coal is concentrated in large developed and developing countries.  Coal could thus easily be 
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redefined as ‘secure’ and ‘ethical’ against unreliable, ‘addictive’ and ‘terrorist’ (and 
‘neoliberal’) oil.  
 
The acceptance of these new ‘security threats’ thus is also acceptance of a redefinition and 
expansion of the legitimate role of the state in limited liberal government.  And while state 
mobilization for war is the most obvious manifestation of such expanded power, the ‘need for 
massive investment in infrastructures to extract, harness, process, transport and covert 
energies’ (Smil, 2010:125) – and for the low-carbon innovation needed to decarbonize energy 
– is itself a major argument for such expanded state power (and associated forms of 
enterprise) given the context of the new ‘normal’ of pervasive security threats in which 
energy (security) plays such a central role.  At the intersection of triple economic, energy and 
environmental crises, this would include, for instance, the national importance of incubating 
emerging clean-tech industries, including clean coal.  Insofar as state support is deemed 
crucial for success of such industries, this also provides the argument for expansion of the 
state and a revitalized industrial policy across the world, in both ‘developed’ and 
‘developing’ countries.  China is again central here; the nation-state whose global rise, using 
a model of massive state-owned enterprises especially in core national interests such as 
energy and telecoms, is the global exemplar of this new paradigm. 
 
This suggests the first set of ways in which the power regime of ‘clean coal’ will likely mark 
a definitive break with neoliberalism.  First, it provides and is fundamentally built upon a 
new discourse of security threats and possibilities of market failure, while neoliberalism 
accepts no such existential challenges or limits.  Secondly, this new liberalism also thereby 
accepts, and is premised upon, an explicit argument for the legitimate, but limited, expansion 
of state power.  Indeed, in both respects, this new liberalism can therefore present 
neoliberalism as itself a constitutive element of the security threats and the inability of the 
prior regime to address them; while re-empowerment of states may also afford the necessary 
counterweight to bring financialized, tax-avoiding, global neoliberal elites (Urry, 
forthcoming) finally to heel.   
 
Such a liberalism, therefore, is also a revised form of ‘classical liberalism’, which was also 
perfectly compatible with, and indeed dependent upon, growth of the state as the vehicle for 
‘defending’ emergent bourgeois society.  Yet it is revised (‘version 2.0’) given precisely the 
transformation of the state over the preceding neoliberal period.  The expanded state is thus 
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also qualitatively transformed.  China is again an exemplar in this regard, with coal mining 
itself a key example.  For even though this is an industry that certainly remains in the hands 
of the state, precisely as a security priority, these are no longer simply monolithic hierarchical 
and centrally-planned enterprises.  Rather, the organization of business is increasingly 
subjected to neoliberal market disciplines and its mines are increasingly concentrated and 
part-privatized (Wright, 2006), thereby destroying public and/or collective forms of 
ownership and associated socialist/social democratic connotations of the ‘state’.  This is also 
increasingly true regarding the role of the state in innovation, including in energy.  Against 
the worn-out neoliberal refrain of the state’s ineptitude in ‘picking winners’, the Chinese state 
is slowly developing just the capacities of the ‘flexible state’ (Mazzucato, 2011) now being 
counselled by Western innovation scholars as the route out of economic stagnation.  In short, 
economically China is increasingly the exemplar of a renewed (classical) liberalism precisely 
because of its strong, but neoliberalized, state-owned enterprises.  
 
3) An emergent socio-technical regime of electrified, low-carbon transition:  A key 
dimension of liberalism is a productive socio-technical energy system and its positive 
feedback loops, which generate its dynamism and social power vis-à-vis contending regimes.  
‘Clean coal’ forms a central node in an emerging system of ‘low-carbon’ electrified 
technologies and practices, of both use and innovation, that also make central use of the web 
2.0-enabled social media of the (increasingly smart-phone hosted) internet.  ‘Clean coal’ is 
thus part of a clean coal-electricity socio-technical system, no longer steam power and 
heating, and so associated with clean, ‘smart’, modern development not dirty, backward, 
industrial labour.   
 
China, again, is likely to be a central player in these developments in coming decades.  This 
is not only because of the enormous and growing social importance of Chinese social media 
(Yang, 2009), with the world’s largest on-line population and a whole generation of young, 
on-line Chinese entrepreneurs determined to get their piece of a vision of growing Chinese 
prosperity.  But in major ‘sectors’ of the economy, the improving capacity for and specific 
technological focus of Chinese low-carbon innovation offers crucial self-propagating 
dynamics.  For instance, regarding urban mobility, China stands alone in its commitment, at 
all levels of government and from major national corporations, to development of electric 
vehicles (Tyfield, 2012b).  These initiatives will continue to increase demand for clean 
electricity, while reducing consumption (and imports) of GHG-emitting oil.  But meeting 
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these demands for increased electricity will simply mean other, and possibly increased, 
pollution; unless, that is, China’s ‘black’, coal-fired electricity generation is transformed into 
‘green’ clean coal.   
 
China is also crucial to the emergence of such a new socio-technical system given the key 
question of the source of (consumer) demand for low-carbon innovations (Bhidé, 2009) and 
the ‘opportunities for growth’ needed to attract massive levels of investment (including from 
Western private finance).  A crucial element of any emergent low-carbon regime, therefore, 
will be the (discourse of the) rise of the materially aspirational ‘billions’ that constitute the 
emergent ‘middle class’ of the large, fast-developing countries, China in particular (Cheng, 
2010; Cf Guo, 2008).  Coal will have a central role to play in constructing their material 
prosperity and the growing consumerism for all other commodities, including the electrified 
platforms of 2.0-connectivity.  But the growth of this class is also likely to strengthen 
domestic political demands for pollution control and hence clean coal; an issue already 
attaining new levels of political importance given the emergence of 2.0-enabled protest, 
particularly by the urban, young and ‘middle class’ (Xiao, 2011).   
 
The totemic centrality of the Chinese middle class to this political regime also provides a 
further way in which it breaks with neoliberalism.  Instead of being a political project 
increasingly rejected by Chinese society for benefitting only a tiny elite, notably the cadre-
capitalist class (So, 2003) with its rampant corruption and speculative financial and real-
estate profits, the incorporation of a broader, if still highly circumscribed, Chinese middle 
class would represent a re-legitimization of the political regime.  Prosperity itself will also, 
thereby, be re-legitimized as the hard-earned fruits of tough, competitive work, most 
probably in ‘productive’ sectors of the economy; including, of course, knowledge-based work 
and (green) innovation.   
 
In terms of emergence of clean coal, and CCS in particular, here too socio-technical 
conditions offer key insights into a political regime capable of supporting its systemic 
emergence.  Key elements of the global discourse of CCS are already apparent, in terms of 
being a ‘triple win’ for environment, economy and energy that is resulting in ‘phenomenal’ 
levels of business interest in the UK (Black, 2012).  Hence, the UK’s CCS competition is 
portrayed as a ‘route out of the [economic] crisis’, with the CCS industry’s potential value to 
the UK estimated at £6.6bn per annum by 2020 (Morgan 2012).   
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 To make a meaningful impact on climate change mitigation, deployment of CCS must be fast 
and massive (see above).  Yet,  CCS innovation is currently stalled around the world. Only 74 
projects have been actually announced (Cf 1500 the IEA estimates to be needed to be 
operational by 2035) and the ‘trend is in the wrong direction’ (Watts, 2011).  For instance, 
the US flagship CCS project, Futuregen, was abandoned in 2008, then restarted by the 
Obama administration but with little and uncertain progress since then.  Similarly, in the UK, 
whose government is amongst the most supportive of CCS, its competition for CCS projects 
and research was relaunched in 2012 after an earlier attempt from 2009 finally came to 
naught in 2011 with the cancellation of the only remaining project at Longannet.   
 
None of this paralysis, however, appears to be diminishing political support for CCS as a 
crucial element of low-carbon transition.  Hence the most plausible reading of CCS is that 
initiatives are likely to continue but they develop the capacity for ‘clean coal’ much slower in 
reality than suggested by the rhetoric which will be needed to support them.  The problems of 
CCS thus also provide a window into the conditions under which it begins to succeed.  And 
while the US, Canada and EU are currently leading in terms of number and progress of CCS 
ventures (Worldwatch, 2012), it is again in China that the most significant developments 
have been in recent years.   
Key to these has been a seeming change of heart around 2009/10 in the Chinese 
government’s attitude to CCS (Friedman, 2009; Watts, 2011).  As CCS emerged onto policy 
agendas in the 2000s, China was clearly reluctant to take any lead in developing the 
technology, given perceptions of its expense as a penalty on development and of the 
responsibility for mitigation resting primarily with the global North.  In recent years, 
however, the Chinese government’s interest in CCS seems to have changed.  A report by the 
Worldwatch Institute (Carbon Capture Journal, 2011) argues that ‘China could become a 
world CCS leader (and technology exporter) within the next two or three decades’, a 
conclusion supported by the IEA (China Daily, 2011).   The Worldwatch report notes the 
‘significant and encouraging progress’ even as ‘Chinese CCS development still lags behind 
the world leaders’.  Evidence of progress in the flagship Greengen project corroborates these 
conclusions (Tollefson and van Noorden, 2012). 
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If CCS does become a viable prospect in China, both commercially and technologically, and 
an industry that offers genuine prospects of global Chinese dominance, however, the global 
fortunes of CCS innovation will be utterly changed.  Such is the importance of coal to China 
that a China doing CCS will make it a globally viable technology, thereby stimulating the 
commercial competition and investment that are currently lacking.  This, of course, would be 
another crucial positive feedback loop in the emergent clean coal-electricity system.  
Implications of such innovation for the emergent political regime, however, are mediated by 
the new knowledges and truths of such a system. 
 
4) Knowledges:  CCS innovation provides an excellent example of the constellation of 
uncertainties besetting low-carbon transition more generally (Tyfield, 2013).  Markusson et 
al. (2012), for instance, list 7 key uncertainties that are currently major obstacles to CCS take-
off.  As well as various techno-economic uncertainties (e.g. regarding the challenges of long-
term ‘safe storage’), however, there are also key uncertainties associated with ‘economic and 
financial viability’, ‘policy, political and regulatory uncertainty’ and ‘public acceptance’.  
These latter uncertainties, especially, may be discussed from a power perspective in terms of 
discourses that will legitimize both such innovation and the government policies to support it.   
 
Even to acknowledge these latter issues is, again, to make a distinct break with neoliberalism.  
From a neoliberal perspective, there should be no question regarding the economic viability 
of an innovation since it is up to the market to decide if it should succeed and this is precisely 
what will happen.  Similarly, public acceptance is not a matter of political deliberation but is 
and should be simply a matter of sufficient consumer demand (or not) for the product.  
Furthermore, the solutions implied by such questions – namely, the need for ‘additional 
policies [i.e. state intervention] to support CCS’ (Markusson et al., 2012:909) – also display 
significant shifts away from a free market radicalism. 
 
But, the types of knowledge and institutions of knowledge production to tackle these 
uncertainties of CCS innovation also illuminate what this new political regime is, as well as 
what it categorically is not.  While increased state involvement to some extent seems 
necessary, even this is not enough given the exceptional challenges of coordination for a 
socially engineered, highly time-pressured and global transition (Tyfield, 2013).  These 
challenges are fundamentally ones of the knowledge of policy-makers and their all-too-
apparent limits in the face of the complex, non-linear, multi-factorial challenges they are 
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hoping to tackle.  As a result, management of these problems demands new types of 
knowledge (both technical and political/legitimatory) and new institutions of knowledge 
production.  In both respects, the emergence of web 2.0-enabled networks is absolutely 
central. 
 
On the one hand, regarding technical knowledges, the challenges of the multiple uncertainties 
of CCS described exemplify a broader shift in policy thinking – away from market 
fundamentalism – about issues of energy, innovation and their respective political economies.  
First, these uncertainties highlight precisely the complexity and non-linearity of the problems 
– of climate change, energy systems and coordinating their multi-agent transition – from 
which political interest in CCS springs.   Secondly, a further irreducible complicating factor 
is that CCS projects must be developed in specific geographical places, against the 
presumptive globalized universality of neoliberal ‘common-sense’, which can treat locations 
as largely interchangeable when deciding where to offshore a semiconductor ‘fab’ factory.  
Thirdly, CCS itself is only being pursued at all to the extent that it promises to solve (or at 
least mitigate) an existential security threat, not purely as a self-evident opportunity for profit.  
It is thus an example of the new age of ‘responsible’ innovation needed to tackle these 
challenges.  But the very model of this innovation is also ‘responsible’ in that it takes 
seriously precisely the complexity of problem and solution; for instance, in acknowledging 
the importance of, and informational gains in, 2.0-enabled professional knowledge-sharing 
networks and ‘public engagement’.  This process is, of course, precisely to manage the new 
crises and risks through an expansion of freedoms, the acme of (classical) liberal government; 
but here as a ‘liberalism 2.0’ in which knowledge must flow and be constructed in such web-
2.0 networks, rather than via the nineteenth century’s individual, private and elitist expertise.   
 
On the other hand, regarding knowledges of legitimation, complexity of the problems and 
their solution can also be harnessed through web-2.0 social media, opening up the resulting 
knowledge production to a much broader (set of) public(s).  This is a process that is already 
well underway not only in the global North but also increasingly in authoritarian and one-
party state China (Xiao, 2011); a form of ‘consultative Leninism’ (Tsang, 2011) that both 
contains but also employs web-based popular expressions of outrage to manage risks and 




Moreover, this new empowerment of Chinese society precisely benefits the class that is the 
symbol of the emergent socio-technical regime.  For it is the emergent ‘middle class’ – 
overwhelmingly in large and developed cities, young, educated and engaged in ‘knowledge 
work’ – who are online and participate in such political protest, especially regarding technical 
risks.  Yet, as the Chinese internet best exemplifies, this construction of new freedoms is not 
only the construction of new avenues for the government of societal threats, but also entirely 
compatible with a commensurate increase in powers of state surveillance and coercion.  In 
short, therefore, just as China exemplifies a classical economic liberalism precisely because 
of the strength of its state-owned enterprises, so too China in fact increasingly exemplifies a 
classical political liberalism (regardless of whether or not there is the oft-anticipated ‘Chinese 
Spring’) precisely because it is an anti-democratic, elite-bourgeois regime. The construction 
of clean coal and Chinese global leadership in CCS exemplifies, and could construct, 
precisely this form of government. 
 
5) The new ‘spectres’ 
For (classical) liberalism, the negative and positive faces were inter-dependent.  Similarly, 
what is the new shadow world, the systemically necessary exclusions that afford a critique of 
the emerging ‘low-carbon’ society of a Sinocentric world? We briefly outline two examples 
of the newly excluded subjectivities thus constructed. 
 
Key here is the dynamic of liberalism’s inherent social binarism, played out in redefinition of 
the new intra-national losers as a racial other who are to be ignored, contained and repressed.  
For instance, on the one hand, the growth of clean, dependable, but relatively more 
expensive, clean coal-electricity conditions profitable investment in and growth of hi-tech 
knowledge jobs, especially for the BRICs middle class.  This, in turn, affords their (possibly 
green) consumerism and creates new win-win profitable opportunities for further ‘middle 
class’ jobs.  Moreover, these are also opportunities for Western businesses, creating a new 
global dynamic of economic growth and growing prosperity.  Intrinsically excluded, 
however, are the expanded industrial workforce in these same countries that is an irreducible 
concomitant of increased middle class consumerism; workers, moreover, now employed in 
hugely powerful quasi-state enterprises that are evermore highly automated and mechanized 
thereby auguring deskilled and insecure employment, and who face comparative energy 
poverty given unsubsidized national energy markets subject to the carbon taxes/prices that 
make CCS commercially viable.  This resonates with current trends of fiscal austerity, 
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reduction of welfare states and a lack of solidarity with benefit claimants in the erstwhile 
‘core’ (e.g. NCSR, 2012), suggesting an economic convergence between China and the 
global North, up and down respectively.1   
 
Secondly, the new materialized discourses of ‘complexity’ and ‘responsible innovation’ 
provide a new common-sense epistemology underpinning liberalism 2.0’s new-found 
legitimacy.  This facilitates and legitimates the self-propagating interactions amongst 
growing 2.0 knowledge networks of CCS engineers/innovators, improvement of Chinese 
innovation capacity, and development of complex knowledges and their 2.0 ‘open’ 
institutions; thereby embedding the robustness (and so, power) of this socio-technical system.  
But, conversely, these materialized discourses also deepen the possibility of exclusion and 
delegitimation of numerous positions and voices from political debates regarding low-carbon 
transition.   For instance, the environmental activist, outside the relevant CCS networks and 
opposed to coal per se and its (overwhelmingly unsequestered) costs, may be written off with 
increasing ease as someone (whether naively or malevolently) unaware of the complexities of 
low-carbon transition and the crucial role of coal in this process, and of the latest facts on the 
‘impressive’ level of progress in CCS ‘now being made’.     
 
This liberal political regime is thus explicitly not concerned with democratic governance by 
the whole citizenry.  Rather, given the nature of the ‘global’ security threats (thus defined) 
and the advantages of massive state-supported corporations, this also presages a political, and 
not just economic, convergence between the West and China towards various systems, all of 
which de facto rule by and on behalf of a growing (globally-)connected knowledge ‘middle 
class’. 
 
As such, with the new systemic losers both newly encumbered and delegitimized, this 
demands greater policing, thereby constructing the truth of the ‘enemy in our midst’ that 
perpetually haunts the new system and constitutes the new common-sense of security threats, 
especially given the vivid memories of (the, as yet in 2013, far-from-over) systemic crisis.  A 
‘clean coal’ low-carbon transition thus suggests a future in which dramatic intra-societal 
inequalities and violence continue from the end of the neoliberal era; societies reminiscent of 
1 Luce (2012)  notes the accelerating ‘hollowing out of the middle class’ in the US. ‘US median household is 4.8 
per cent poorer now than at the start of the recovery in 2009. Median incomes have now fallen to the pre-
internet level of 1993.’ 
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Dickensian (and liberal) London, with these stark social divisions legitimated as the 
‘necessary’ concomitants and costs of low-carbon progress. 
 
6) Conclusion  
Energizing society has recently emerged as a key concern for the social sciences.  Such 
analysis, however, must pay due attention to the interaction of energy/entropy, the 
construction and maintenance of socio-technical (energy) systems and parallel construction 
of power technologies and political regimes.  This paper has provided an initial illustration of 
such a perspective, tracing multiple connections between coal and liberalism and all that the 
latter entails: both in the past and, more speculatively, in the medium-term future.  In 
particular, we have highlighted the essential social binarism, inequalities and anti-democratic 
pressures in both instances, suggesting a ‘clean coal’-based low-carbon future may well be 
significantly less ‘progressive’ than as presented in many high-profile policy visions.  
 
The socio-technical system of ‘clean coal’ exemplifies and constructs this new power regime. 
It energizes the complex emergence of this new socio-technical system, since the negentropy 
afforded by (innovation in) clean coal substantially drives the rest of the emergent system.  
But it also powers this process, the construction of new freedoms and coercions, hence new 
powers, and circuitously itself.  In this way, we can appraise clean coal as the multiple 
paradoxes it is, namely as: 
 
1) ‘Green’ and the most polluting of fossil fuels, massively accelerating GHG emissions 
as CCS roll-out slowly catches up; 
2) ‘Clean’ and light, especially as mediated by electrification and identified with new, 
hi-tech knowledge industries and heavy, dirty, discredited and invisible industrial 
labour; 
3) An ‘essential’ part of global low-carbon transition and hugely deepening structural 
dependency on fossil fuels vs. decentralized renewable energy networks; 
4) A condition for equitable economic development of non-‘Northern’ countries and 
‘innovation catch-up’ and for intensified and expanded economic exploitation of the 
‘Southern’ working class; 
5) A ‘responsible’ innovation trajectory, as one element in a ‘portfolio’ of measures to 
tackle complex global environmental challenges and a reckless experiment, at 
unprecedented scale, with accelerating emissions and anthropogenic climate change; 
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6) Energizing and empowering a new, more populous and seemingly progressive class – 
of 2.0-networked, BRICs-inclusive, green knowledge-workers – and conditioning a 
global de-democratization, including in the liberal democracies of the global North, 
towards a bourgeois-elite, liberal regime. 
 
These characteristics are thus both the reprise of 19th century liberalism and its profound 
transformation, as if reflecting a political regime on the ‘way up’ and the ‘way down’, 
tragedy and farce respectively.  To be sure, as in nineteenth century Britain, this will also 
present new openings and platforms for resistance; resistance, moreover, that will play a 
constitutive role, in the first instance, in emergence of this liberal low-carbon society.  As 
with classical liberalism, however, we may also expect that formation of unified and 
powerfully situated sites of resistance will follow the system’s initial construction, and so can 
only be imagined even further into the speculative future.  The outlines of a movement 
responding to the critique sketched here, thus, must be the focus of future research. 
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